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Evidence of the statistical signiﬁcance of proﬁts in Q regressions remains one of the principal ﬁndings
in the empirical investment literature. This result is frequently taken to support the view that capital
market imperfections are an important element for understanding investment. This paper challenges
that conclusion. We argue that allowing the proﬁt function at the ﬁrm level to be strictly concave,
reﬂecting, for example, market power, is suﬃcent to replicate the Q theory based regression results
in which proﬁts are a signiﬁcant factor determining investment. To be clear, our ability to replicate
the existing results does not require the speciﬁcation of any capital market imperfections. Thus the
friction that explains the statistical signiﬁcance of proﬁts could be market power by sellers rather
than capital market imperfections.
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In the large empirical literature on models of capital accumulation, there is ample
evidence that ﬁnancial variables, such as proﬁts, are signiﬁcant regressors for current in-
vestment.1 The empirical ﬁnding of signiﬁcant proﬁts often appears in empirical investment
studies based upon “Q theory”. This ﬁndings have been very inﬂuencial: they appear to un-
derlie the position that capital market frictions are necessary to explain observed investment
behavior.
The basic idea of Q theory is to solve the dynamic optimization problem of a ﬁrm
with convex costs of capital adjustment. The ﬁrm will optimally weigh the current marginal
costs of investment against the future marginal returns. Under some assumptions (essentially
homogeneity restrictions on the proﬁt and adjustment cost functions), this marginal gain can
be proxied for by the value of the ﬁrm relative to its capital stock, a value called “average Q”.
The power of this approach to investment is that an observeable, average Q, completely sum-
marizes the expected discounted present value of additional investment. Under this theory:
current proﬁts should not explain current investment.
To many economists, the ﬁnding that proﬁt measures are signiﬁcant in investment
regressions is taken as prima facie evidence of capital market imperfections. Thus these
results provide motivation for numerous theories of credit frictions. Further, the statistical
signiﬁcance of proﬁts, along with the large costs of adjustment generally found in these
empirical papers have lead to the conclusion that the Q-theory approach is an empirical
failure.
1Surveys of this literature are numerous. See, for example, the discussion in Chirinko [1993] and Ca-
ballero [1997] and the references therein. Noteworthy recent papers discussing this evidence are Gilchrist and
Himmelberg [1995, 1999], Cummins, Hasset and Oliner [1999] and Erickson-Whited [2000].This paper argues that these conclusions may not be warranted. Much of the existing
empirical work rests upon the substitution of average Q in place of marginal Q since the former
is observable. However, this is appropriate only under very strict assumptions concerning the
proﬁt and cost of adjustment functions. Our analysis studies investment models which do not
satisfy the Q-theory assumptions: ﬁr m sm a yh a v em a r k e tp o w e ra ss e l l e r s . 2 Hence, marginal
and average Q are not identical so that empirical models using average Q are misspeciﬁed.
Potentially this misspeciﬁcation can “explain” the failures of the Q model.3 Speciﬁcally, this
paper addresses the following question: can the signiﬁcance of proﬁt ﬂows found in Q-based
investment regressions be explained by an empirically relevant model without capital market
imperfections?4 Further, can this model also explain the large estimated adjustment costs?
The diﬃcult aspect of addressing these questions is the lack of analytic results for
the types of investment models we wish to study: i.e. those in which the speciﬁcation of
technology and adjustment costs do not satisfy the restrictions of Q theory. Evaluation of
models outside of the Q-framework is diﬃcult empirically since these alternatives are not
easily reduced to simple linear relationships.5
2The fact that marginal and average Q will diverge when ﬁrms have market power is discussed by Hayashi
[1982, Proposition 2]. Galeotti and Schiantarelli [1991] estimate an investment model allowing for market
power and ﬁnd support for it Their analysis, however, does not attempt to “explain” the ﬁndings in the more
traditional Q theory based empirical literature.
Hayashi and Inoue [1991] estimate a Q model for Japanese ﬁrms and argue that the model may ﬁt the light
industry ﬁrms poorly, with cash ﬂow signiﬁcant, because these ﬁrms have market power.
3The recent contribution of Erickson-Whited [2000] also focuses on measurement errors. However, their
analysis introduces measurement error into Tobin’s Q but maintain conditions such that average and marginal
Q are the same though they recognize that violations of these assumptions could inﬂuence the inference. On
this, see the discussion on pg. 1036-37 of Erickson-Whited [2000]. Our approach, in contrast, is to relax
assumptions of homogeneity in the proﬁt function and thus allow for a gap between average and marginal Q.
4We use the term “empirically relevant” here to constrain our search for parameterizations that are not
at variance with other investment facts.
5Tractability, of course, is one of the arguments in favor of the linear quadratic structure. Our ﬁndings
indicate the cost of this simplication: results based upon this structure may be misleading.
2Our empirical approach is structural in nature. We analyze a dynamic programming
problem for a ﬁrm with market power which we solve numerically and compare to the data.
We estimate relevant parameters by comparing the moments generated by our simulated
model with the data. In particular, we use an indirect inference approach so that the pa-
rameters of our models are selected to match observed Q-theory regressions augmented by
cash ﬂow measures.6 This is a methodological innovation that complements the more general
approach we are taking to understanding investment.
Our ﬁndings are ﬁrst that with the addition of a reasonable amount of curvature in
proﬁt functions, one can reproduce the regression results commonly found in the Q theory
based empirical investment literature. In particular, proﬁts enter the regression signiﬁcantly
a n dw i t hac o e ﬃcient close to that reported by others without the introduction of borrow-
ing restrictions into the ﬁrm’s optimization problem. Second, the parameterization of the
quadratic adjustment costs function is quite reasonable: the estimated cost of adjustment
function is close to the quadratic model.7 Third the level of adjustment costs is much lower
than that inferred by other researchers. Finally, we ﬁnd that our unconstrained model can
also match empirical results based upon sample splits which were intended to partition the
sample into constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms. In our results, no ﬁrms are constrained and
diﬀerences between “large” and “small” ﬁrms reﬂect small diﬀerences in adjustment costs and
other parameters.
6This approach is presented in Gourieroux, and Monfort [1996], Gourieroux, Monfort and Renault [1993].
Cooper and Haltiwanger [2000] use this approach to study investment with nonconvex costs of adjustment.
Adda and Cooper [2000] use a structural estimation approach to study the impact of scrapping subsidies on
new car purchases. Willis [1999] estimates the distribution of price adjustment costs using indirect inference
as well.
7However, our speciﬁcation does not allow for nonconvex costs of adjustment as in, for example, Cooper
and Haltiwanger [2000].
3Overall, our ﬁndings challenge the prevailing wisdom that Q theory based investment
regressions support the view that ﬁrm’s face borrowing restrictions. In fact, our results do not
indicate that Q theory is alive and well: only that is has been buried for the wrong reasons.
2. Dynamic Capital Accumulation
Our approach to the neoclassical investment model is easily understood from examin-
ing a dynamic optimization problem in which a ﬁrm chooses the level of capital that maximizes
the discounted expected value of its proﬁts.8The ﬁrm incurs adjustment costs when investing
a nonzero amount. New capital is productive in the following period and depreciates at an
exogenous rate, δ.
Letting K denote the current stock of capital, A, a shock to productivity or demand,
π(K,A) the proﬁt level in state (K,A), p the relative price of capital, the optimization
problem can be expressed as a dynamic programming problem. 9 The value function for the
ﬁrm V (K,A) solves:
V (K,A)=m a x
K0 π(K,A) − p(K




Here π(K,A) represents a reduced form proﬁt function generated by the ﬁrm’s solution over
other, freely adjustable factors of production.
In this problem, the ﬁrms faces no borrowing constraints. For example, investment
8Out approach builds upon Lucas-Prescott [1971] though they restrict attention to a competitive
framework.
9This representation of the ﬁrm’s problem does ignore variations in the cost of capital which are more
likely to be relevant for a time series analysis, as in Abel-Blanchard [1986], than for our study which is based
largely on cross sectional variations.
4expenditures do not have to be ﬁnanced out of current proﬁts. The ﬁrm chooses tomorrow’s
capital (K0) using its conditional expectations of future proﬁtability, A0.O f c o u r s e , t o t h e
extent that A0 is correlated with A, current proﬁts will be correlated with future shocks and
thus informative about future proﬁts.






where subscripts on the functions denote partial derivatives. The right side of this expression
is conventionally termed “marginal Q” and denoted by q. Note the timing: the appropriate
measure of marginal Q is the expected discounted marginal value of capital in the following
period due to the one-period investment delay. Using (1), this expression can be simpliﬁed




0)+p(1 − δ) − CK0(K
00,K
0)}. (3)
The diﬃcult aspect of this theory is its empirical implementation. As the value func-
tion and hence its derivative is not observable, (2) cannot be directly estimated. Thus the
theory is tested either by ﬁnding a suitable proxy for the derivative of V (K,A) or by esti-
mating the Euler equation, (3). We focus here exclusively on estimates based upon using
the average value of the ﬁrm as a substitute for the marginal value of an additional unit of
capital.10
10Given the prominence of this approach in the literature, it is natural to focus our analysis on these results.
5A. Q Models
The traditional Q theory model places additional structure on (1). In particular,
following Hayashi [1982], assume that: π(K,A) is proportional to K, and that the cost of










With this speciﬁcation, one can show that V (K,A) is proportional to K so that marginal q
equals V (K,A)/K, a term that is called “average Q” and denoted here as ¯ q. 11
Using this relationship between average and marginal Q, (2) implies that the invest-
ment rate is a linear function of the expected value of future ¯ q. Note that the theory implies
that ¯ q contains all the information necessary to determine the ﬁrm’s optimal investment. In
particular, the theory does not suggest that past investment rates or any measures of current
proﬁts and/or ﬁnancial variables are needed to ascertain the optimal investment plan for the
ﬁrm.
B. General Proﬁts and Cost of Adjustment Functions
This section returns to the more general dynamic capital accumulation problem given
in (1) without the added restrictions of Q theory. Instead of assuming current proﬁts are
linear in capital, as required by the Q theory model, consider
π(K,A)=AK
α (4)
11The argument follows Lucas-Prescott [1971] and Hayashi [1982]. Note that the quadratic adjustment cost
is suﬃcient, homogeneity of the adjustment cost function is necessary.
6where α parameterizes the curvature of the proﬁt function. This curvature most naturally








This is a slight generalization of the quadratic cost of adjustment though it is still homogenous
in (I,K).
The key step away from the traditional Q model is simply allowing α < 1. Hayashi
[1982] demonstrates that in this case marginal Q is always less than average Q.S o , t h e
curvature of the proﬁt function creates a measurement error in the standard investment
regression model as there is a gap between average and marginal Q due to the strict convavity
of the proﬁtf u n c t i o n .
The extension to non-quadratic costs of adjustment has a similar motivation. While
the quadratic case, when combined with homogeneity assumptions, clearly makes the in-
vestment problem tractable, there is clearly no ap r i o r ilogic for this curvature assumption.
Our methodology allows us to explore more general speciﬁcations and thus to evaluate the
quadratic restriction.12
3. Empirical evidence
There are numerous surveys of the investment literature with appropriate emphasis
on results using average Q as a proxy for marginal Q. Here we focus on empirical evidence
12Abel and Eberly [1999] and Barnett and Sakellaris [1999] also allow for non-quadratic costs of adjustment.
Further, there is a signiﬁcant literature investigating the implications of nonconvex costs of adjustment, as
in Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger [1995] , Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power [1999] and Cooper-Haltiwanger
[2000]. Relatedly, Caballero-Leahy [1996] study the relationship between investment and Q in a nonconvex
environment.
7using the Q framework and then turn to estimation of our structural model.
A. Evidence on Q Models
The theory predicts a very speciﬁc investment equation for the Q theory models: the
investment rates depends only on the expected value of average Q.13 Letting it denote period
t observation for ﬁrm i,t e s t so fQ theory on panel data are frequently conducted using an
empirical speciﬁcation of:
(I/K)it = ai0 + a1E¯ qit+1 + a2(πit/Kit). (6)
The theory implies that the coeﬃcient on expected average Q, a1, should equal 1/γ. The
constant term is allowed to pick up ﬁrm speciﬁc heterogeneity that may arise from diﬀerences
in the adjustment processes across ﬁrms, as in Gilchrist and Himmelberg [1995]. Note that
this speciﬁcation includes the proﬁtr a t e ,(πit/Kit). In fact, Q theory does not suggest the
inclusion of proﬁt rates in (6). Rather, this variable is included as a way of evaluating an
alternative hypothesis in which the eﬀects of ﬁnancial constraints are not included in average
Q. Hence researchers focus on the statistical and economic signiﬁcance of a2.14
The results obtained using this approach have been mixed. Two ”problems” have
emerged: (i) the relatively high value of the adjustment cost parameter and (ii) the signiﬁ-
cance of proﬁts or other ﬁnancial variables as a regressor.15
13Again, the timing assumption is that there is a one-period delay associated with the delivery and instal-
lation of new capital. In some applications, new investment is assumed to be immediately productive so that
the appropriate measure of average Q is the current one.
14Gomes [1998] makes an important point here: even if there are borrowing restrictions, they will appear
in the value of the ﬁrm.Whether they are properly accounted for in average and marginal Q is less clear
and again depends on the homogeneity of the underlying proﬁt and cost functions and on the nature of the
borrowing restrictions.
15In fact, the view that these models ”fail empirically” is commonly held. See the concise discussion in
8On the ﬁrst, point, while speciﬁcations and thus estimates of the coeﬃcients certainly
vary across studies, it is not uncommon to ﬁnd extremely low estimates of a1 and thus an
inference of large adjustment costs. In his original study of this model, Hayashi [1982], found
a1 =0 .0423. Abel and Blanchard [1986] obtain nonsigniﬁcant coeﬃcients for contemporane-
ous average Q. Fazzari Hubbard and Petersen [1988] obtain extremely low coeﬃcients (for
example, a1 =0 .0065 in one of their speciﬁcations) while Gilchrist and Himmelberg [1995]
obtain an estimate for a1 of 0.033.
To appreciate the magnitude of the estimates, a coeﬃcient of a1 =0 .05 implies γ =2 0 .
With an adjustment cost function of
γ
2(I/K)2K,t h i si m p l i e sa na v e r a g ea d j u s t m e n tc o s to f
10∗(δ)2K,using the steady state restriction of I = δK.W i t hδ =0 .15, we get an adjustment
cost relative to the steady state capital stock of 22.5%, which is very large. Put diﬀerently,
a1 =0 .05 implies a 6% adjustment in the ﬁrst period, 50% within 8 periods and 23 periods
until full adjustment, a fairly slow process.16
On the second point, many studies ﬁnd that a2 is positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
f r o mz e r ow h i c hi sar e j e c t i o no ft h eQ theory. For example, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen
[1988] divide their panel into three classes of ﬁrms determined by the ratio of dividends to
income. They report signiﬁcant eﬀects of cash ﬂow on investment for all types of ﬁrms though
ﬁrms with higher dividend/income ratios have smaller cash ﬂow coeﬃcients.17 However, their
Erickson and Whited [2000] for example. Other common results in Q regressions are that residuals are serially
correlated and lagged variables are signiﬁcant (Chirinko [1993], Abel and Blanchard [1986]). This is a further
sign that the model is misspeciﬁed, see West [1998].
16This is derived from an experiment where α =0 .7, γ =2 0 , δ =0 .15, θ =2 , β =0 .94.T h e r e a r e t w o
possible states where the transition matrix for Markov process has 0.9 on the diagonal. The ﬁrm is assumed
to start at the steady state associated with the low state of probitability. The proﬁtability shock then jumps
to the high state. It takes 23 years to get to the high steady state.
These numbers change signiﬁcantly (but not overwhelmingly) if we have a1 =0 .5 or γ =2 . Then 14% of
the adjustment occurs in the initial period and 54% within 5 periods, up to 18 periods to full adjustment.
17See their Table 5, instrumental variable estimation results. Cash ﬂow coeﬃcients are 0.455 (0.029) for
9¯ R2 measures fall dramatically from the low to the high dividend ﬁrms (from 0.53 to 0.19).
Both the Q variable and the cash ﬂow variable explain more for the low dividend ﬁrms:
apparently whatever makes cash ﬂow more signiﬁcant also makes Q more signiﬁcant.
Gilchrist and Himmelberg [1995] obtain stronger results in favor of ﬁnancial frictions.
One of the important aspects of the Gilchrist-Himmelberg study is their construction of a
proxy for marginal Q. As they note, one of the problems interpreting the signiﬁcance of cash
ﬂow variables in investment regressions is that these factors may be forecasting future proﬁts
rather than constraining current investment. Using their panel, they estimate forecasting
equations for marginal Q and argue that any remaining explanatory power of ﬁnancial vari-
ables will reﬂect capital market imperfections. 18 With this measure of Q,w h i c ht h e yt e r m
”Fundamental Q”, Gilchrist and Himmelberg report (see their Table 2) that for their full
sample Fundamental Q is not signiﬁcant and cash ﬂow is barely signiﬁcant.19 However, for
their sample splits, ﬁnancial variables are insigniﬁcant for their ”unconstrained” subsample
and are sometimes signiﬁcant for their ”constrained” subsample.
Cummins, Hassett and Oliner [1999] take an alternative approach to separating the
informational content of proﬁt ﬂuctuations. For their data set, they do report familiar ﬁndings
in terms of standard Q regressions.20 In particular, the response of investment rates to
variations in average Q are quite small (implying a large value of γ) and cash ﬂow is a
signiﬁcant regressor. However, when they replace average Q with their measure of Q based
low ratios, 0.418 (0.038) for middle ratios and 0.238 (0.010) for high ratios. Low ratios are deﬁned as less
than 10% for at least 80% of the sample observations, between 10% and 20%, and more than 20%.
18In doing so, they assume that the proﬁt function is linearly homogenous of degree one.
19In contrast, for their regressions without cash ﬂow measures, the coeﬃcient on fundamental Q exceeded
that from their results using Tobin’s Q. Further, this coeﬃcient was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
20In particular, see their Table 5.
10upon earnings expectations, ﬁnancial variables are no longer signiﬁcant.
B. Empirical Implications of the More General Model
Our perspective on these results is quite diﬀerent. We argue here that the apparent
failure of Q theory stems from misspeciﬁcation of the ﬁrm’s optimization problem as it ignores
market power. Suppose that the proﬁt and/or cost functions did not satisfy the conditions
speciﬁed in Hayashi [1982]. As a consequence, average and marginal Q diverge so that the use
of ¯ qit in the standard investment regression induces measurement error that may be positively
correlated with proﬁts.21 Hence one might ﬁnd positive and signiﬁcant a2 in (6) in a model
without any capital market imperfections.
Consider a version of (1) using the proﬁt and cost of adjustment functions given
in (4) and (5). Our goal is to estimate the key parameters characterizing the proﬁta n d
adjustment cost functions: (α,θ,γ).The key question is whether empirically plausible proﬁt
and adjustment cost functions can reproduce the regression results from estimating (6).
Our methodology follows the indirect inference procedures described in Gourieroux and
Monfort [1996] and Gourieroux, Monfort and Renault [1993]. This is a version of simulated
method of moments in that the structural parameters are chosen to minimize the distance
between moments generated by the data and those calculated from the simulated data. As the
moments of the simulated data depend on the underlying structural parameters, minimizing
this distance will, under certain conditions, provide consistent estimates of the structural
parameters. The innovation associated with indirect inference is to use the coeﬃcients of
a reduced form regression to establish moments from the data and then to match these
21We do not attempt to characterize this measurement error analytically but use our simulated environment
to understand its implications.
11coeﬃcients from estimating the same regression oﬀ the simulated data. The reduced form
coeﬃcients from the regression on the simulated data will be close to those from the actual
data at the ”true” values of the structural parameters.
The appealing feature of this approach is that it allows a researcher interested in a
structural model to link results explicitly to existing less structural empirical evidence. For
our purposes, we use the results of Gilchrist-Himmelberg [1995] as representative of the Q
theory based investment literature. Denote their estimates of the investment relationship
parameters,(6), by (a∗
1,a ∗
2). Further, they present evidence for their full sample and for
sample splits based, for example, on ﬁrm size and/or the dividend behavior of a ﬁrm.
We initially focus on results from their pooled panel sample and then return to un-
derstanding their sample splits. At this stage, our goal is to understand the foundations of
empirical results based upon Tobin’s Q. For this speciﬁcation, they estimate a1 = .03 and
a2 = .24.22 As these results are based upon a panel data set, our simulation/estimation
exercise will be conducted within a panel structure too. To do so, we decompose the shocks
to proﬁtability into two components: an aggregate shock common to all ﬁrms and a ﬁrm
speciﬁcs h o c k .
The aggregate shock process is taken from the Cooper-Haltiwanger [2000] analysis of
proﬁtability shocks in the LRD. We represent this process as a two-state Markov process
with a symmetric transition matrix in which the probability of remaining in either of the two
aggregate states is .8.23
22These estimates are reported in their Table 2. Note that these regressions included time dummies and
were estimated in ﬁrst diﬀerences to remove ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. Since we have no ﬁxed eﬀects build into our
model, we do not need to remove them and hence focus on regression results in levels.
23In fact, our estimates are not very sensitive to the aggregate shocks. Instead, the model is essentially
estimated from the rich cross sectional variation, as in the panel study of Gilchrist-Himmelberg [1995].
12Estimates of (α,γ)
Our initial estimation exercise assumes the quadratic cost of adjustment speciﬁcation
(θ =2 )and focuses on estimating the curvature of the proﬁtf u n c t i o n(α) and the level of
the adjustment costs (γ). So, the only variation from the standard Q theory model is ﬁrm
market power. In order to focus the initial estimation on these key parameters, we set other
parameters at levels found in previous studies: δ = .15 and β = .95.T h i sl e a v e s(α,γ) and the
stochastic process for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks to proﬁtability as the parameters remaining
to be estimated. We estimate both the serial correlation (ρ) and the standard deviation (σ)
of the proﬁtability shocks.
Our approach to estimation requires two pieces: solving the dynamic programming
problem and then simulating a panel data set. For each value of the vector of parameters,
Θ ≡ (α,γ,ρ,σ),w es o l v et h eﬁrm’s dynamic programming problem, using value function
iteration. In order to solve the dynamic programming problem at the ﬁrm level, conditional
expectations need to be formed using the parameters of the stochastic process for the ﬁrm
speciﬁcs h o c k s ,(ρ,σ). The method outlined in Tauchen [1986] is used to create a discrete
state space representation of the process for any (ρ,σ). Since the estimation makes extensive
use of the cross sectional properties of the panel data set, we allowed 16 elements in the state
space for the idiosyncratic proﬁtability shock.24
Once the dynamic programming problem is solved, a panel data set can be created
by simulation using the estimated processes for the shocks and the policy functions derived
from the solution of the dynamic programming problem. For the simulations, we assumed
24Allowing for ﬁner grids for capital and the shocks or increasing the number of ﬁrms or years had no
noticeable eﬀect on our estimates.
13there were 400 ﬁrms and 50 years of data.
Given this data set, the Q theory model is estimated and other relevant moments
are calculated. The regression was of the same form as (6). Thus for each value of Θ, we
obtain estimates of the parameters of (6), call them (ˆ a1,ˆ a2) ,w h e r ew eh a v ei g n o r e dt h e
constant term. Further, we use three other moments reported by Gilchrist-Himmelberg: the
serial correlation of investment rates (.4), the standard deviation of proﬁt rates (.3) and the
average value of average Q (3).25
Let Ψd denote the vector moments from the data and Ψs(Θ) denote the corresponding
moments from the simulated data, given the vector of parameters Θ. For our problem,
Ψ
d =[ .03 .24 .4 .33 ] .
As in all moment matching exercises, a discussion of why these particular regression
coeﬃcients/moments were chosen to match is appropriate. Clearly, given the motivation
of trying to understand the reduced form empirical evidence from investment regressions,
coeﬃcient estimates from (6) are obviously important to the exercise. The serial correlation
of investment rates and the standard deviation of proﬁt rates are necessary to pin down the
parameters of the driving process. Finally, average Q was included to guarantee that our
estimates of the curvature of the proﬁt function did not produce unreasonably high proﬁt
rates since average Q is determined by the discounted present value of average proﬁtr a t e s .
Beyond the economic relevance of these moments, it is also important that they are responsive
25T h ea v e r a g ev a l u eo fa v e r a g eQ and the standard deviation of the proﬁt rate (measured as cash ﬂow)
comes from Table 6 in Gilchrist-Himmelberg [1995]. The serial correlation of the investment rate comes
directly from Charles Himmelberg and we are grateful to him for supplying this calculation.
14to variations in the underlying parameters of our problem. This property was veriﬁed in our
simulations and underlies the standard errors of our estimates.







where W is an estimate of the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of Ψd.26 The estimate
of Θ, ˆ Θ, solves:
min
Θ J(Θ).
The diﬃcult aspect of this problem is in characterizing the highly nonlinear mapping from
the structural parameters Θ to the objective function J(Θ). Note that this parameter vector
is overidentiﬁed since we are trying to match two regression coeﬃcients and three moments
using only four parameters.
The second row of Table 1a presents our estimates of structural parameters and stan-
dard errors.27 At the value of ˆ Θ given in the second row of Table 1a we are able to closely
match Ψd,as indicated by Table 1b.28
26We used a multi-stage procedure to estimate the parameters and to determine W.W eﬁrst estimated the
parameters assuming that W was the identity matrix. This produces consistent estimates. We then simulated
multiple panels using these estimated parameters and for each panel reestimated the basic Q regression and
recalculated the moments. We then computed the variance-covariance matrix from these moments. This new
estimate of W was then used to reestimate the coeﬃcients. This procedure was repeated until the parameter
estimates did not change much. This same estimate of W was used to compute the standard errors, following
Gouriéroux and Monfort [1996,Chpt. 4]
27The computation of standard errors follows the description in Chapter 4 of Gourieroux and Monfort
[1996].
28In Table 1 and throughout, IC stands for imperfect competition (α < 1). GH95 refers to Gilchrist and
Himmelberg [1995]. Quadratic adjustment costs are indicated by θ =2 , sc(I/k) indicates the serial correlation
of the investment rate, std(π/k) indicates the standard deviation of the proﬁt rate, and ¯ q denotes average Q.
15Structural Parameters
α γ ρ σ θ
GH95
IC, θ =2 .689(.011) .149(.016) .106(.008) .855 (.04) 2
Table 1a
Reduced Form Coef. Estimates/Moments
a1 a2 sc I
K std π
K ¯ q
GH95 .03 .24 .4 .25 3
IC, θ =2 .041 .237 .027 .251 2.95
Table 1b
The model, with its four parameters, does a good job of matching four of the ﬁve
estimates/moments. The model is unable to reproduce the high level of serial correlation in
plant-level investment rates. This appears to be a consequence of the fairly low level of γ
which implies that adjustment costs are not very large.
In terms of interpreting our results, the estimated curvature of the proﬁt function of
.689 implies a markup of about 15%.29 This estimate of α and hence the markup is not
29Let p = y−η be the demand curve and y = Akφl(1−φ) the production function. Maximization of proﬁt
over the ﬂexible factor, l, leads to a reduced form proﬁt function, π(k,A,w) where w i st h ew a g er a t e .T h e
exponent on capital is
φ(η−1)
(1−φ)(1−η)−1. With φ = .33, we ﬁnd η = .1315, implying a markup of about 15%.
16at variance with other estimates in the literature. It (α) is larger than the curvature esti-
mate reported by Cooper-Haltiwanger [2000] for their analysis of plant-level proﬁt functions.
Gilchrist and Himmelberg [1999] estimate the marginal proﬁt function and, by our calcula-
tions, ﬁnd a curvature of between .5 and .8.30 Galeotti and Schiantarelli [1991] ﬁnd signiﬁcant
market power for ﬁrms and a markup of about 33%.31 Finally, Hayashi and Inoue [1991] es-
timate a Qmodel on Japanese manufacturing data and argue that ”The poor performance
of the Q model for light industry may be attributable to the fact that the market for this
industry is mostly domestic and more or less protected from international competition.” 32
The other interesting parameter is our estimate of the level associated with the quadratic
cost of adjustment, γ. As noted above, under the null of Q theory, this parameter is the inverse
of the coeﬃcient on average Q in the investment regression. Hayashi initially estimated this
parameter at about 20. Subsequent work has led to lower estimates, including that produced
by Gilchrist and Himmelberg [1995] who ﬁnd parameter estimates as high as .33 and thus
γ =3for their ”unconstrained ﬁrms”.33
An interesting point from our results is that the estimate of γ is not identiﬁed from the
regression coeﬃcient on average Q. While this inference is correct when the proﬁtf u n c t i o n
exhibits constant returns to scale, it is not true when the function is strictly concave. In fact,
t h ee s t i m a t e dv a l u eo fγ = .149 is far from the inverse of the coeﬃcient on average Q (about
30If one uses cash ﬂow their estimates using sales imply (see their footnote 10) a mean value of 0.76 and a
range of 0.25 to 1.88, and if one uses operating income one gets a mean value of 0.49 and a range of 0.16 to
1.17.
31This estimate is based upon their discussion of their Table 1 estimates.
32Though they assume a perfectly competitive ﬁr m ,t h e yg oo nt on o t et h a t“ C a s hﬂow can be signiﬁcant
because of its correlation with monopoly rent.” Our results conﬁrm these views. In fact, this suggests an
exercise of looking cross sectionally at markups and regression coeﬃcients from the Q model. We are grateful
to Peter Klenow for discussions of this point.
33Note though that this result does not come from a regression with Tobin’s Q. So, the inference from the
standard Q theory, which requires average and marginal Q to be equal, does not apply here.
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Thus, in the presence of market power, we see: (i) why proﬁts are signiﬁcant in the
standard Q regression and (ii) that actual adjustment costs are much smaller than those
inferred under the standard Q regression. Essentially, the misspeciﬁcation of (1) by assuming
perfect competition creates a measurement error in the standard Q investment model as
average and marginal Q are not the same. It is this measurement error that lies at the heart
of these results.34
Sample Splits
The large empirical Q literature also distinguishes between ﬁrms that are likely to
be constrained in ﬁnancial markets and those that are not. One distinction is often made
between large and small ﬁrms with the presumption being that the former are less likely to
be constrained. Since there is no model of credit market frictions contained in most of these
papers, the fact that large and small ﬁrms behave diﬀerently is not ”explained”. This is
particularly troublesome given the constant returns to scale environment which implies that
size should not matter.
An interesting issue is whether our model can explain diﬀerential ﬁndings by ﬁrm size.
In Table 2 we report regression results from Gilchrist-Himmleberg [1995] for their large and
small ﬁrm splits, as well as our estimation results. Using their discussion of the data, we
assume that the serial correlation of investment rates, the standard deviation of proﬁtr a t e s
and average Q do not vary by ﬁrm size.35 As in Table 1, we report the structural parameter
34Another way to see this point is to note that if one regresses investment rates on average Q,t h er e g r e s s i o n
errors (which contain investment ﬂuctuations not explained by average Q) are positively correlated with proﬁt
rates. This does not arise when we regress investment rates on a measure of marginal Q.
35This point is made in the Appendix of Gilchrist-Himmelberg [1995].
18estimates as well as the moments for each of two samples in Tables 2a and 2b.36 Note that
here we again impose the quadratic cost of adjustment.
Structural Parameters
Sample α γ ρ σ θ
LARGE
GH95:
I.C., θ =2 .693(.009) .234(.023) .073(.005) .862(.037) 2
SMALL
GH95:
I.C., θ =2 .691(.007) .255 (.07) .123 (.029) .856(.032) 2
Table 2a
36For the estimation, we recomputed W using the simulation method described above.
19Reduced Form Estimates




GH95: .027 .124 .4 .25 3
I.C., θ =2 .048 .129 .178 .24 3.07
SMALL
GH95: .056 .2 .4 .25 3
I.C., θ =2 .064 .2 .078 .251 2.98
Table 2b
It is important to note that our exercise does not make use of an auxillary model to
impose diﬀerences in ﬁrm size. Rather, we let the data tell us whether there are signiﬁcant
economic diﬀerences between large and small ﬁrms by doing separate estimation exercises for
diﬀerent subsets of empirical results. As before, our inputs to the process are the moments
we wish to match and our output is the same set of moments (approximately matched) and
the corresponding estimated parameters.
This exercise is fairly successful. We are able to match the diﬀerential responses of
investment to cash ﬂow coeﬃcients which is a crucial element of the ﬁnancial frictions empir-
ical literature. The estimation procedure does this by ﬁnding a slightly smaller adjustment
cost parameter (γ)f o rl a r g eﬁrms and a larger serial correlation of shocks for small ﬁrms. To
the extent that current proﬁts are informative about future proﬁt opportunities, the higher
20estimate of ρ for smaller ﬁrms is consistent with the increased responsiveness of investment
to proﬁt ﬂows (a2) in the reduced form regressions reported in Table 2b. Another interesting
characteristic of these results is that the estimation procedure ﬁn d st h es a m ec o n c a v i t yo f
proﬁts for the two sets of ﬁrms, basically unchanged from the one obtained when matching
the full sample results.
Given these parameter estimates it is not diﬃcult to generate size diﬀerences across
ﬁrms. One could augment the production process by incorporating some measure of man-
agerial ability into the production function. The induced diﬀerences in productivity would
create additional size diﬀerences but do not change the estimated structural parameters very
much.37
Estimates of ( α,γ,θ)
As a ﬁnal exercise, we focus jointly on the curvature of the proﬁta n dt h ec o s to f
adjustment function. Instead of forcing the adjustment function to be quadratic (i.e. setting
θ =2in (5)), we allow the curvature of the adjustment cost function to be determined by
the data. We proceed as above by ﬁnding the values of these parameters that minimize J(Θ)
where Θ =( α,γ,ρ,σ,θ). From here it is quite clear that the model with quadratic costs is
not a bad speciﬁcation: the estimated value of θ is quite close to 2.38. The other parameter
estimates, not surprisingly, remain relatively unchanged.
37This results we obtain by simulation of a model where we vary the mean of the proﬁtability shock A to
mimic diﬀerences across ﬁrms. While these changes in proﬁtability clearly inﬂuence the size of the ﬁrm, they
have relatively little eﬀect on the reduced form estimates and moments calculated from the simulated data,
as in Table 2.
38Abel-Eberly [1999] report a curvature estimate such that the marginal adjustment cost function is convex
as do Barnett-Sakellaris [1999].
214. Conclusions
Our model can produce regression results very close to those obtained in empirical
studies based upon the Q theory model. In stark contrast to the conclusions reached in those
studies, our model does not contain any capital market imperfections. Instead, it diﬀers from
the standard model by adding market power and so moving away from the linear-quadratic
structure generally taken as given in those exercises. Thus, the statistical signiﬁcance
of proﬁt rates in the standard Q investment regression may not reﬂect capital
market imperfections.
Additional insights into these competing models can be obtained by looking explic-
itly at the implications of a model with borrowing constraints. Apparently, there has been
little systematic study of the alternative model to determine whether the rejections of the
basic Q model could reﬂect capital market imperfections. One exception is Gomes [1998]
who introduces a ﬁnance cost for external funds. Interestingly, he ﬁnds that capital market
imperfections of this form will be summarized in marginal Q and thus, under the right as-
sumptions, captured by average Q as well. This ﬁnding is, indirectly, additional support for
our argument.39
Of course, there are many models of capital market imperfections to consider and also
other formulations of adjustment costs beyond the quadratic speciﬁcation that underlies the
Q model. Particularly appealing might be a model with non-convex market participation.
This would model the conjecture that ﬁrm size is important for capital market imperfections
and, more generally, to allow the constraints on ﬁrms to be endogenous. Further, this might
39In fact, Gomes [1998] says that “This provides support to the argument that the empirical success of
cash ﬂow augmented investment regressions is probably due to measurement error in q.”
22tie in with evidence on the lumpiness of investment expenditures.
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